

EYES ONLY

Approved For Release 2002/11/10 : TOP SECRET 80-01065A000500090001-3

TOP SECRET

DOC. NO. PSE D-34

EYES ONLY

DATE October 30, 1952

WHEN SECTION III C

COPY NO. 47

IS INCLUDED

*DOD (OSD), DOS & NSC
REVIEWS COMPLETED*

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council

by the Psychological Strategy Board

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2002/11/10 : TOP SECRET 80-01065A000500090001-3

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

3 November 1952

Mr. James Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
The National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lay:

I have the honor to transmit herewith to the President and the National Security Council a Progress Report on the National Psychological Effort for the period July 1, 1952 through September 30, 1952.

This is submitted in accordance with your "Memorandum to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board - Status of United States Programs for National Security," dated May 29, 1952.

This Report was approved at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board held October 30, 1952.

Sincerely yours,

Alan G. Kirk
Alan G. Kirk
Director

Enclosures;

PSB D-34, Copies 6 and 7

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

841893/

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

COPY No. 47

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Evaluative Summary of Significant Psychological Activities...	2
II. The Work of PSB.....	6
III. Summaries of Reports:	
Department of State.....	15
Department of Defense.....	19
*Central Intelligence Agency.....	24
Field Representatives of Mutual Security Agency.....	38
Text of Report of Department of State.....	ANNEX A
Text of Report of Department of Defense.....	ANNEX B

* The Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is
specially classified.

84189//

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Page 1 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

I. SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psychological activities during the reporting period on the part of the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capabilities for making an immediately effective psychological contribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence. These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in building capabilities for future development.

3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian "jamming" continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the whole field of communications. Insofar as Communist China is concerned, the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses.

Anti-American Attitudes

4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propaganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial increase
was made

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189/1

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect and non-attributable propaganda. However, the above trend makes clear the importance of still further increasing our efforts to develop indirect and non-attributable information activities.

Western Europe

5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues to cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes favorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusiasm continues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military, i.e., NATO and EDC. However, U. S. psychological action has contributed to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries, notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration attitudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread of neutralist sentiments.

Middle East

6. The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U. S. capabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country, though some limited results of non-attributable activities are reported. The danger of further deterioration in Iran, emphasizes the importance of rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries, where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt, the political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the present

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189/1

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements that make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, however, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.

Far East

7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was increased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological impact of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid programs. Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been expanded, especially in the non-attributable field, but little increase in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the United States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolutionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological obstacle. [REDACTED]

25X6

25X6

Korea

8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained widespread acceptance in the non-communist world.

"Hate America" PropagandaSECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189/1

Page 4 of 41-3

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952"Hate America" Propaganda

9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been concerned with combatting the Soviet-Communist "Hate America" propaganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on this subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propaganda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by the Department of Defense and its components of information on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United States operations.

Military Assets for the "Cold War"

10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribution these services can make to the national psychological effort. However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of approved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and missions upon which military psychological activities in peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189//

Page 5 of 41

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

II. THE WORK OF PSB

General Activities

11. A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with special reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed and submitted to the Board. Pending development of capabilities and situations which may make it possible to envisage a final solution of the cold war, it proposed continued effort in the direction of building capabilities and effecting cumulative retraction of Soviet power.

12. A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with the understanding that it might be "worked into an early speech" in order to provide current psychological operations in Eastern Europe with needed support without implying any more ambitious programs there.

13. The Board decided that intra-agency and inter-departmental coordination for social science research in support of psychological operations should be further developed and agreed to continued PSB association with this study.

Planning

14. During the period under review, the first comprehensive area plan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for approval. This paper, entitled "A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany", lays down basic guidance for U. S. psychological operations aimed at furthering the integration of the German Federal Republic into the Western European Community, and other national objectives.

15. A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area -- Japan -- was completed in draft form during the Quarter and circulated to the departments and agencies concerned for final comments before submission to the Board in the coming Quarter.

16. Apart from

84189/1

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 6 of 41

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance for national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two plans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept of national psychological strategy planning. On the basis of the lessons derived from them, the Director's staff began a study aimed at improving the PSB planning process as a whole.

Coordination

17. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with respect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and Italy was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries took advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems in connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their experiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans was initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to determining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future.

18. In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating panel for implementation of the plan in the field.

Evaluation

19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's responsibility for "evaluation of the national psychological effort". At the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of the national psychological effort directed at Italy. The staff has also undertaken, as part of a larger government-wide economic policy study, an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic policies in the These projects should contribute

additionally

84189/1

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 7 of 41

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

additionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable approaches for future evaluation activity,

20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for the Quarter:

21. Plans Completed and Being Executed

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/c), and
- (b) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15/b)

(1) During the Quarter under review, the Washington inter-departmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome continued to coordinate U. S. activities under these plans.

(2) According to Embassies Paris and Rome, the French and Italian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to take vigorous action to reduce communist power in their respective countries. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United States should continue to remain in the background, while making known to both governments our concern that vigorous anti-communist action be pursued. They are also agreed that principal liaison should remain at the prime ministerial level.

(3) The Quarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in communist tactics, reflected in both France and Italy, i.e., away from a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist groups and toward a policy of "respectability" and cooperation with non-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and ability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti-communist action might be impaired. In turn, the U. S. would find it more difficult to influence these governments and their people

in taking

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

in taking a strong anti-communist position.

(c) Psychological Operations Plan for
Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "A"
(PSB D-18/a)

(1) Organization under this plan, which is administered by the Department of State, was completed during the period under review. Figures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now total 20,995 in the countries of reception, plus estimated arrivals of 429 per month. Projects authorized or underway include language and vocational training courses, a visa opportunity search, and registration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care for their urgent immediate needs.

(2) Resettlement is now in progress. Voluntary agencies have requested transportation for 860 escapees under the program. Actual departures number 295, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas. Propaganda utilization has been made of individual cases of resettled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news media. The Department of State has under development a propaganda plan for exploiting the escapee program as such.

(3) Funds obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953 now total [] This includes an initial authorization of [] in dollars and [] in counterpart funds.

(4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been slight. The Department of Defense reports implementation of the Lodge Amendment as follows: applications for recruitment, 6008; rejections, 4847; acceptances, 395; scheduled for processing, 108; under review by CIC, 655. The Department of the Army does not contemplate any further liberalization of the conditions under which escapees may be recruited.

(d) Staff Study

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

- (d) Staff Study--Preliminary Analysis
of the Communist BW Propaganda
Campaign with Recommendations
(PSB D-25/b)

This study, which is connected with the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign, was approved by the Board on August 7. Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating operational planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was assigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. At PCC direction, a Working Group on Hate America Propaganda has been assigned to the problem.

22. Plans Completed But Not Yet Being Executed--Stand-By Plans

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident
to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations
(PSB D-7/c), and
- (b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

The first of these plans is designed to establish special psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to our adversaries, to be implemented in the event of successful cease-fire negotiations. The second plan endeavors to establish for government departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. Overt operational planning under both plans is substantially complete. Covert operational planning is currently being revised.

- (c) Plan for Conducting Psychological
Operations During General Hostilities
(PSB D-8/b), and
- (d) National Overt Propaganda Policy
Guidance for General War (PSB D-11/b)

Both the plan and the guidance have been distributed to the

various

84188/

Security Information

Security Information
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

various departments and agencies for their use, and have been integrated by the military services with their war planning. Planning on inter-departmental problems relating to psychological policies and operations in the event of war is currently being accomplished by an X-Day Committee under the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

23. Plans Authorized And In Process Of Development

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "B"
(PSB D-18a/1)

This phase of the plan is concerned with the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the stimulation of defection together with the proper utilization of such escapees. Progress in drafting the final plan will be largely dependent on a decision as to what use will be made of the funds available under Section 101 (a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act. Phase "A", concerned with the care, resettlement and possible utilization of current escapees, is reported on above (see paragraph 21-c).

- (b) A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)

This plan will prescribe certain desirable psychological courses of action in respect to: (1) supporting the achievement of German unity; (2) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe; (3) actions designed to reduce Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany.

- (c) Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D-22)

(1) This plan will provide a national psychological strategy, designed to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen Western influence in the Middle East, and to insure

that the

84189/1

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

that the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world. It will seek to accomplish these objectives by psychological measures aimed at overcoming instability within these countries, strengthening the will and ability of these countries to resist aggression, and establishing a new relationship with these states which will recognize their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign equality.

(2) Annexes covering the basic factors and considerations are now being developed in order to aid in crystallization of the psychological strategy concept and selection of the psychological objectives and tasks.

(d) Psychological Strategy Planning for
Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without. Difficulties in policy interpretation are being resolved and Board approval is expected during the next Quarter.

(e) Program of Psychological Preparation
for Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24)

The participating agencies are now in the process of clearing a Revised Draft.

(f) Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan (PSB D-27)

Following the adoption by the National Security Council of NSC 125/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with

Respect to

84189//

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 12 of 41

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

25X6
NSC

Respect to Japan", the Panel agreed to a draft of a plan which is designed effectively to assist, [REDACTED]

25X6
NSC

[REDACTED] in carrying out the objectives of NSC 125/2 necessary to maximize Japan's contribution to the attainment of U. S. objectives in Asia.

(g) Psychological Strategy for Economic
Security Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Orbit
(PSB D-28)

The plan is designed to provide a national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of U. S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free World of U. S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. Suggested courses of action to be developed will be governed by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee's decision as to what should be U. S. policy in informational statements to foreign governments with respect to trade in goods which are not covered by the Battle Act and other Security Lists.

(h) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare
Against the USSR (PSB D-33)

The Board has accepted a recommendation that a panel be created to examine the field of ideological warfare specifically directed against Soviet doctrine, and to make recommendations as to how the United States can gain superiority in this field.

(i) Western Europe

In consultation with member agencies, particularly the Department of State, a preliminary study is being undertaken to determine the most fruitful approach to a psychological strategy plan for Western Europe.

(j) East

84189/r

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

(j) [REDACTED]

25X6

On instructions from the Board, an inquiry was carried out by the Director's staff which concluded that a program for utilization of young [REDACTED] escapees would be of definite psychological value. However, it was impossible without answers to specific questions to weigh the psychological desirability against the cost of overcoming physical obstacles to such a program in [REDACTED]. At the suggestion of the Director the Department of State has undertaken a survey in [REDACTED] to determine the advantages and disadvantages which would result if such a program were inaugurated.

25X6

24. Planning Procedure

An analysis was made of the difficulties which have been encountered in developing PSB plans. Recommendations were developed for an improved format for national psychological strategy plans.

84189/1

Security Information
TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952III. SUMMARIES OF DEPARTMENTAL AND AGENCY REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD
UNDER REVIEW.A. Summary of the Report of the Department of State on the
Foreign Information Program*

During the period under review the tasks of the Foreign Information and Educational Exchange Programs of the Department of State continued to be those set forth in NSC 114/2, namely, to multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism; to intensify and accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and governments of the free world; to combat extremism and neutralism; to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism the hope of ultimate liberation; and to maintain particularly among the peoples and governments of Latin America continued recognition of mutual interdependence.

The Report lists the principal actions taken by the Department of State in endeavoring to carry out these tasks. They include:

1. Projecting to the peoples and governments of nations dominated by Soviet Communism the growing strength and unity of the free world. This involved exploiting in the programs of the International Information Administration such policies, activities and events as "OPERATION MAINBRACE", joint NATO maneuvers on the European continent, the AMZUS Conference, the development of tactical atomic weapons, and exposure of the deceitful nature of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany.

2. Projecting

* The full text of the Department of State report is appended as ANNEX A.

SECURITY INFORMATION

84189/1

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

2. Projecting the peaceful intentions of the U. S. through exploitation of our disarmament efforts, of our patient attempts to reach an armistice in Korea, and of the justice of the UN Command's refusal forcibly to repatriate prisoners of war. Particular emphasis was put on exposing the manifest absurdity and evil purpose of the Soviet hate campaign, including the bacteriological warfare charges.

3. In its continuing attempts to aggravate internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism, the Information Program endeavored to exploit such items as the strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the peoples of the USSR implied in plans for the Communist Party Congress; the purges of Communist Party leaders in the satellites and in France and Italy, and the implications of the refusal of large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea to return to China.

4. Convincing peoples and governments of the free world of the need and the possibility of building up adequate military strength as a deterrent to war. This involved exploitation of "OPERATION MAINBRACE" and other maneuvers in Europe; it included also encouragement of moves toward European integration, including the exploitation, largely through indigenous means, of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Authority, of developments within the Council of Europe, and of progress toward the European Defense Community.

5. Maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions and reliable leadership of the U. S. included

special

84189/

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRETP&B D-34
October 30, 1952

special efforts to give a balanced understanding of developments, especially those affecting foreign policy, growing out of the Presidential election. Special efforts were made in the Information Program to explain the motives of the U. S. when differing with the United Kingdom in the Iranian crisis and with France on the North African problem. The program also placed special emphasis on projecting a greater understanding of the cultural maturity of the United States. Examples of this were the European tour of "Porgy and Bess", the participation of American artists in the Venice UNESCO Conference, and presentations of typical artistic creations at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris.

6. Combatting neutralism through exposing its dangers as a means of safeguarding individual liberty and freedom and as a subversive device of Soviet Communism.

7. Combatting instability and extreme nationalist tendencies, particularly in the Near and Middle East. The report notes that exploitation of the USAF airlift of pilgrims from Beirut to Mecca was left largely to indigenous channels, but was the subject of a pictorial pamphlet produced by the U. S. Information Services in Beirut, of a film, and of a series of statements by members of the crews of the planes involved.

8. Maintaining hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism. Largely through the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin, efforts were made to explain statements in the Presidential campaign concerning U. S. policy towards the

84189//

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

satellites; to interpret the significance for the satellites of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress; to expose the "Hate America" campaign; to portray the Sino-Soviet meeting in Moscow in a light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese as to the motives of the Peiping regime in dealing with the USSR;

9. Fostering American solidarity through exploitation of such actions as the visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil, the conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth status, and through efforts to expose the threat to Latin American countries inherent in Soviet Communism.

10. Operational activities listed in the Report include approval of a project for the establishment of an IIA regional Service Center in Beirut; inauguration of a new series of Information Policy Guidances known as "Information Guidance Bulletins," initiation of radio programs in nine languages by the ship-borne transmitter "The Courier," stationed at Rhodes; production and distribution of a film showing participation of the individual American voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates, and scheduling of another film showing the voter's participation in the election of the President.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Page 18 of 41

84189/1

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952B. Summary of the Report of the Department of Defense*

During the reporting period the Department of Defense and the military services have continued to make noteworthy contributions, incident to their primary military mission, to the national psychological effort. However, one of the considerable difficulties noted within the Department of Defense in engaging in cold war activities (except in a supporting role) continues to be the fact that the Department's role in such activities is principally implied. There exists no specific delineation of authority and responsibility upon which military psychological operations in peace-time may be based. Some such specification for the Department of Defense would contribute to more effective participation of the military services in the national psychological effort. This observation applies both to operations designed to attain an independent psychological effect, and to operations in which, although their primary purpose is military, political or economic, psychological factors must be considered.

During the period under review, military and naval maneuvers and statements of high military officials have served psychological ends, primarily in Western Europe. Although the potential psychological impact of maneuvers at home and abroad is not yet wholly integrated into operational plans, continuing attention is being devoted to this matter.

The Department of Defense has joined in combatting anti-American sentiments, particularly in Europe, by various means within its area of responsibility. The Department of Defense feels, however, that we are still on the defensive in regard to the "Hate America" campaign generally.

In the

* The full text of the Department of Defense report is appended as
ANNEX E.

84189/1

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

Page 19 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

In the Middle East, the Beirut-Jidda airlift and several other operations involving the Department of Defense have contributed materially to the creation of a psychological climate more favorable to the West. In Korea, notable actions include the North Korea target warning operations and continuous and effective leaflet drops.

Research and forward planning in the psychological field continue, directed for the most part to the contingency of general war. Efforts are continuing to define the specific role of the Department of Defense as an active participant in the cold war.

Operations by Areas

1. In the European area, contributions to reduction of neutralism and anti-Americanism include participation in U.S.-French military maneuvers east of the Rhine and U.S.-British-French ground and air maneuvers in Germany; alert drills of the U.S. garrison in Berlin; the large-scale NATO naval maneuvers in the North Sea and the Baltic; fleet visits to Yugoslavia and elsewhere; and statements by General Midway and other senior U.S. commanders re-emphasizing the need for, and practicality of, an unremitting collective effort to build a position of strength against aggression. In the field of troop-civilian relations, a marked degree of closer cooperation and collaboration between U.S. commanders and local government officials has been achieved and will be pressed forward. A trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe. The continued policy of offshore procurement of supplies from European sources contributes indirectly to these ends by stimulating the European economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic defense forces.

2. In the
84189//SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Page 20 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

2. In the Middle East, two operations during the reporting period, involving Defense Department action, have contributed to the psychological effort. These were the airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda, and the airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon. In addition, new evidence has emerged of the favorable impact obtained from the good-will tour of Lebanese-born U.S. jet ace Major Jabara (previously reported). These actions, undertaken specifically for their psychological effect, have made a significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in the area.

3. In Latin America the Department of Defense continued to assist in the training and equipping of national military forces, thus contributing to the support of U.S. national policy and to the stability of existing governments,

4. In Korea the conduct of a program to warn civilians residing in 78 North Korean cities of the impending bombing by the United Nations Command expresses the intent to save non-combatant lives, and at the same time is designed to increase the pressure on the communist negotiators at Panmunjom. The continued refusal of the United Nations Command to use force in repatriation of prisoners of war has gained wide support in the free world. Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations, directed at North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers, were continued at a high level. Reports continue to indicate wide readership of the leaflets (of which nearly 3 billion have been dropped to date) despite harsh reprisals and scare propaganda used by communist authorities against the individuals involved. In the radio field, a series was initiated

exploiting

84189/1

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Page 21 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

exploiting the statements of Chinese communist prisoners who oppose forcible repatriation. On the debit side, publicity on agitation in prisoner-of-war camps has provided the communists with additional effective propaganda material, despite U.S. attempts to present a contrary interpretation.

Other Activities

1. Psychological exploitation of military power: Certain atomic weapons tests have been exploited psychologically in conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles, and new weapons. Shows of military force have continued, primarily in Europe (as noted above).

2. In addition to various activities indirectly countering the communist "Hate America" campaign, the Department of Defense has cooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies concerned to coordinate the release of information on biological and chemical warfare by the Department and its components; and has joined in the interdepartmental planning task concerned with countering the BW charges and other "Hate America" propaganda.

Forward Planning and Research

1. The Department of Defense continues to conduct a broad program of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations.

2. To further the wartime national psychological effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to

support

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189/1

Page 22 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

support the "Joint Emergency War Plan," using as guidance for this purpose the "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War" approved by the Psychological Strategy Board. The military services and major subordinate commands are currently developing or modifying existing plans accordingly. Planning is progressing on a "Transfer Plan" to facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and personnel to military control.

3. A psychological plan to support the U.S. forces in Japan is being developed.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a paper setting forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.

5. Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological operations in Alaska, developed by the Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189/
Page 23 of 41

Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

D. Summary of Reports by Field Staff Representatives of the
Mutual Security Agency*

Western Europe

The defense build-up and its attendant problems continued to dominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period under review. Although the period closed with a short-term upswing in optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the major obstacles to the attainment of U. S. policy objectives in the area.

Following are the significant psychological factors noted;

1. Renewal of the Mutual Assistance Program by the U. S. Congress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and continuity of U. S. policy. However, the relationship of rich benefactor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the "foreign aid" concept, remained the most important single obstacle to favorable psychological exploitation of U. S. programs in Europe. A new concept, geared to the partnership approach, would provide a much healthier climate for psychological operations.

2. The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in the pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-summer the noticeable lift in European confidence and morale which had followed the Lisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there were signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement contracts, change in political leadership in Germany, and the Pinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed to some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of

war,

* This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by the Information Division of MSA.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189 / 1
Page 38 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

war, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense continued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort.

3. Progress toward ratification and realization of the European Defense Community, particularly in France, ran afoul of diminished public enthusiasm.

4. NATO, while maintaining general support as a defensive alliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination. It is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The NATO Information Service has remained ineffective.

5. The impression is spreading in Europe that the economic situation is not getting any better. As the quarter ended, employment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in some places. On the other hand, pressures on living standards and general economic development, growing out of the defense program, were causing visible restlessness. Some progress was achieved by MSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field of productivity and technical assistance. But U. S. tariff and trade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to our general efforts abroad.

6. Neutralism, in its "third force" context, continued to give ground in the face of Europe's growing military strength, the developing sense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace offensive. At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up from the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very serious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented rebuttal needs to be made.

7. Anti-Americanism remained on the increase. Contributing factors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

of U.S.
84189/1
Page 39 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETPSB D-34
October 30, 1952

of U. S. troops abroad, the current U. S. election campaign, Congressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad that American officials tended to be more blunt and insistent in their relations with European governments. Economic pressures of the defense program, the generalized European unhappiness with the state of the world, and the feeling in some quarters abroad that America is taking too strong a line against Russia have also been contributory causes of anti-Americanism.

In assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in dealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points to further progress during the quarter in the integration of MSA and State information operations, and to increasing acceptance of the idea within the U. S. government that our information operations should be somewhat decentralized. At the same time, the report draws attention to serious shortcomings in organization, procedure and direction:

1. MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act for guidance as to "national objectives."
2. There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy and operations coordination between military and civilian information elements. This is evident in such programs as offshore procurement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe.
3. The NATO information services have not developed an effective positive program, and remain weak.
4. Recent experience has underlined the effectiveness of indirect propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further development in this field.

5. In view

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189/1

Page 40 of 41

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-34
October 30, 1952

5. In view of the great size and psychological impact of the annual influx of American tourists in Europe, more should be done to study and influence this particular movement.

Southeast Asia (Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Formosa, Malaya)

Favorable psychological results accrued during the quarter from MSA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use of DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating trachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid. Distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a noticeable impact in the area. Installation of community radio receivers widened the audience available for information programs.

At the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the maximum psychological impact from U. S. programs in the area were impeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. S. position, in the belief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an identification with Western colonial interests and indigenous ruling groups, in the face of a rising tide of revolutionary nationalism.

The report concluded with the following suggestions:

1. Local personnel should be trained to take over from American personnel as quickly as possible in our various information, economic and social programs.
2. A special effort should be made to influence and support intellectuals, professional people and upper income groups, since their influence is disproportionately large throughout the area. Possibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to establish close liaison with these individuals.
3. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest caliber of U.S. personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

84189//
Page 41 of 41

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000500090001-3

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000500090001-3